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KEYNOTE: The Transmission of Information:
An “Awful Deformation” of What Communication
Really Is
John Shotter
University of New Hampshire, USA
The London School of Economics, UK
__________________________________________________________________
It is easy to think of communication as being primarily to do with the
transmission of information, with the communication of facts, of intelligence, of
things people want to know about—a view given scientific expression long ago
by Shannon and Weaver (1949). The taken-for-granted background to this
view being the Cartesian assumptions of a mechanical world of separate,
identifiable, interacting entities in motion according to discoverable laws.
Everything changes, however, once we switch to a view of communication as
occurring within a ceaseless, indivisible flow of entwined strands of
spontaneously responsive, expressive, living, bodily activity—a view adopted
by all those who see communication as a dialogic activity (e.g., Bakhtin, 1981,
1986; Gadamer, 1975, 2000; Wittgenstein, 1953, 1980; along with many
others.) Straightaway we find, instead of facing simply one kind of difficulty in
life—that of solving problems—we face a second, much more basic difficulty—
that of gaining orientation, of arriving at a sense of what the situation is that
we find ourselves in, prior to our attempts to act well within it.
While the facts of the matter are still of importance to us, what is of even
greater importance is our sensing of the relations between the possibilities for
action it makes available to us and what, ethically, we feel we must do within it
if we are to be the kind of person we feel we want to be. What is special about
our living activities in these situations, is that they work in terms of the ways
in which our past experiences give rise, within us, to an anticipatory sense of
our possible next steps—ethical and political issues then enter into this process
as we try to resolve on a line of action, on an expression of our feelings/
sensings that “does justice” to the uniquely detailed situation we currently
occupy. While some communications can change us simply in our knowledge,
others can change us in our very ways of being in the world, in who we are—it
is the nature of these latter which is central to this keynote address.
Dr. Shotter works internationally as an organizational consultant and doctoral
examiner. His ongoing reserch interest is in the social conditions conducive to
people having a voice in the developpment of participatory democracies and
civil societies. Dr. Shotter’s books include Social Accountability and Selfhood
(Blackwell, 1984), Conversational Realities: The Construction of Life Through
Language (Sage, 1993), and most recently Getting It: Withness-Thinking and
the Dialogical… in Practice (Hampton, 2011).
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Modern'society'expects'[the'expert]'to'provide'a'substitute'for'past'moral'and'
political'orientations.'Consequently,'the'concept'of'‘praxis’'which'was'
developed'in'the'last'two'centuries'is'an'awful'deformation'of'what'practice'
really'is.'(Gadamer,'1975,'p.'312)
...'because'we'are'studying'not'to'know'what'goodness'is,'but'how'to'become'
good'men,'since'otherwise'it'would'be'useless—we'must'apply'our'minds'to'
the'problem'of'how'our'actions'should'be'performed,'because,'as'we'have'just'
said,'it'is'these'that'actually'determine'our'dispositions.'(Aristotle,'1955,
Ethics,'p.'93)

I’m sitting in a restaurant and, as I look across to someone sitting at another table
in a certain way, I notice them also looking towards me in a similar manner; at
that moment, a little ethical and political ‘world’ is created between us. We each
look toward each other expectantly, with anticipations, some shared, some not,
arising from what we have already lived through so far in our lives with all the
others around us. There is a tension ‘in the air’... surely, something next must
happen? So we look away, neither of us being prepared to initiate that
‘something’.
Indeed, to put the point more generally, in our meetings, in any living contact
between any two or more human beings, at least two things of importance occur:
(1) Yet another, third form of life emerges amongst us, the life of our shared
expressions, a collective or shared form of life with its own unique character, its
own unique agency, and its own unique world—within whose terms, for the
duration of our meeting, we can mean things to each other. And it is within this
‘world’ that, (2) we can become ‘present’ to each other, at least to a minimal
extent, as who we are; that is, we can, so to speak, in the course of our meeting,
begin to ‘see into’ each other’s inner lives. Indeed, if we are to gain this kind of
sense of another person as having, in relation to us, an ‘inner life of their own,’
then, ethically, we cannot confront them as we would a material object, we must
relate ourselves to them as an other, as a unique, conscious agency.
Relating to a unique Other in this way, is not currently our concern in our more
academic studies, in which—to the extent that we think of our discipline as “a
multi-disciplinary area of study” (Fiske, 1990, p. 1)—we try to relate to others in
a number of ‘one-size-fits-all’ idealized, general terms.
But what, ethically, would be entailed in our relating to others as the unique others
they are? What would be entailed in our coming to understand them, their life,
their inner lives, not just in our terms, but in theirs? It seems to entail our entering
into what we might call an intimate relationship with them, a relationship with its
own distinctive, qualitative feeling-tone to it, a relationship “more or less outside
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the framework of the social hierarchy and social conventions, ‘without rank,’ as it
were”1 (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 97).
To return to my restaurant example, if it is a stranger with whom we have already
become a little too involved, we quickly look away again, if we simply want ‘to
get on with our own lives’ to avoid, as Goffman (1971) puts it, becoming “locked
together by [various] involvement obligations” (p. 115). And this urge not to be
too deeply involved with the unique others around us seems to be pervasive in all
our communication disciplines also: We treat those we study ‘as anonymous
strangers.’
So this is how I want to begin my explorations here, not with any selected, ideal
theories or models “to which reality must correspond,” says Wittgenstein (1953,
no. 131)—but to proceed like William James (1890), in his “study of the mind
from within” (p. 224).
Methodologically, he begins with what we can notice or attend to from within the
flowing streams of experience occurring within us as we live out our lives
amongst the others and othernesses around us. And he then begins to make
linguistic sense of the particular sensings and feelings he picks out from within
the stream of thought, not by proposing a set of idealized definitions, but by—as I
will call it—a method of comparisons, i.e., by continually trying to say what these
flowing, moving, feelings and sensings are like, 2 and why they cannot be easily
captured in nameable, ‘picture-like’ images:
Sensorial images are stable psychical facts; we can hold them still
and look at them as long as we like. These bare images of logical
movements, on the contrary, are psychic transitions, always on the
wing, so to speak, and not to be glimpsed except in flight. (1890, p.
253).
We live, as it were, upon the front edge of an advancing wavecrest, and our sense of a determinate direction in falling forward is
all we cover of the future of our path... Our experience, inter alia,
is of variations of rate and of direction, and lives in these
1 “Intimate)speech)is)imbued)with)a)deep)con3idence)in)the)addressee,)in)his)sympathy,)in)the)

sensitivity)and)goodwill)of)his)responsive)understanding.)In)this)atmosphere)of)profound)trust,)the)
speaker)reveals)his)internal)depths”)(Bakhtin,)1986,)p.)97).
2)This)is)one)of)Wittgenstein’s)(1953))methods)also:)He)introduces)his)illMde3ined)notion)of)“languageM

games”)as)“objects)of)comparison,”)whose)task)is)“to)establish)an)order)in)our)knowledge)of)the)use)of)
language:)an)order)with)a)particular)end)in)view;)one)out)of)many)possible)orders;)not)the)order”)(no.
131).
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transitions more than in the journey's end. (1912, p. 69, my
emphasis).
Ephemeral though they may be, the particular sensings and feelings that we can
pick out of the stream are not only crucial in our shaping and guiding our
behaviour, as we move around within our surroundings, but the ways in which we
make sense of them—i.e., orient towards them—are basic to ‘who’ and ‘what’ we
take ourselves to be—as well as being crucial also in our trying to answer
Aristotle’s question as to how, ethically, our actions should be performed.
For as living beings, we cannot not be spontaneously responsive to at least some
of the diffuse events occurring around us—even if it is in our power, as we shall
see, to differentiate amongst those still diffuse and yet-to-be determined events.
And it is in the course of our being spontaneously responsive to events occurring
around us—events which ‘stop us in our tracks,’ which ‘strike us,’ which ‘catch
our attention,’ we say—by which, as Vygotsky (1978) puts it, that we as children
“grow into the intellectual life” (p. 88) of those around us, and come to embody
the ways of acting and responding that mark us out as being ‘one of us.’ But this
does not occur just in our early years. As I see it, it is occurring all the time, as we
take each new step into an uncertain future. For certain feelings and sensings
occurring within us—as transitory understandings and as action guiding feelings
(Shotter, 2005)—would seem to be ‘primitive’ or ‘primordial’ in the sense that
they can operate for us, as Wittgenstein (1981) put it, as “the prototype of a way
of thinking, not the result of thought” (no. 541)—we find them ‘there’ within
ourselves as the sense of a unique global ‘something’ prior to all our efforts at
‘making sense’ of that ‘something.’
It is the nature of these of these ‘somethings’—these richly intermingled of
speech-entwined activities and activity-entwined ways of speaking—that I see as
giving a distinctive shape to our ‘identities,’ to our ‘world’ and its ‘horizons,’ and
to all our inquiries—that I see as occurring before what we, in our textbooks, call
“communication” and study in our academic disciplines—that I want to try to
bring into focus in my talk here today. To put it another way, our appropriate use
of words in our everyday affairs is not arbitrary. Due to the unavoidable,
spontaneous responsiveness of our living bodies, and our inner sensing of the
situation in which we are immersed at the very moment of opening our mouths to
speak, is—or it should be, if it is to be a shared situation (ethics again)—itself an
organizing agency in structuring our choice of words. Without it, we would all be
like Humpty-Dumpties in Lewis Carroll’s (1960), Through the Looking Glass and
What Alice Found There:
“There’s glory for you!” he said,
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“I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory’,” Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course you don’t—till I tell
you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock down argument for you!’”
“But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock down argument’,” Alice objected.
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, “it
means what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so
many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s
all.” (pp. 268-269)
To try to use words as we, individually, please—in ways that do not
spontaneously arouse a specific sensing in others—is to use them in ways which
need explaining (as Humpty-Dumpty acknowledges), which gives rise to a need
for interpretation; and the interpretation depends, of course, on the individual
doing it.
Indeed, as I see it, as we move into an intrinsically indeterminate, continuously
changing and developing reality—that is open to an indefinite (or uncountable)
number of determinations—we find ourselves facing, (1) not just one kind of
difficulty in life—that of solving problems—but (2) a second much more basic
difficulty—that of gaining orientation, of arriving at a sense of what the situation
is that we find ourselves in, prior to all our attempts at solving problems within it.
This why, I think, as Gadamer (1975) puts it, our turning to experts within a
particular discipline for their orientations towards moral and political issues, as a
substitute for our past, more everyday ones, is such a disaster. They, always, are
oriented towards a single, ideal, instrumental end, a material product of some
kind.
This is why, instead of trying to start with theories, or models—or definitions in
which we try to name what it is we think of ourselves as studying—I want to start,
like William James (1890) in his famous “The Stream of Thought” chapter, on the
‘wrong’ side of the Cartesian, subjective/objective split, i.e., on the subjective,
‘introspective’ side. About the constitution of the stream of thought, he said, it
consists of
… signs of direction in thought, of which direction we nevertheless
have an acutely discriminative sense, though no definite sensorial
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image [that we could ever give a name to] plays any part in it
whatsoever. (p. 253)
It is that acutely discriminative sense of the signs of direction in thought, that I
want to focus on here. It is the “felt meanings” that the sounding of these words
arouse in us, as we “grow into” the mental life of those around us, that is crucial
to our understanding of how communication works.
‘Relational things’: open, unfinished, dynamic unities
So, we turn now to how I would like to look at communication. As something that
occurs amongst us as living human beings, dialogically-structured communication
must have a certain withness-feel to it—everyone participating within a stretch of
‘communicating’ as it is occurring, is partaking of, or sharing in, a ‘something’
that is common to all of them. Thus, there is—or, ethically, there ought to be—a
special feeling of being ‘in touch with a something other-than oneself’ while we
are communicating: “We are all in this together,” as politicians are currently
trying to tell us... or at least, we should be.3
It is the nature of these “this’s”—that we all can be in together—and especially
the dialogical processes of their coming into being, that I want to explore here
today. For what is special about such events, if they are dialogically structured as
opposed to a collection of objective, quantifiable events, is that within them, “a
plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, … with equal
rights and each with its own world, combine but are not merged in the unity of the
event” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 6). In other words—words that will become much more
relevant later—if they are dialogically structured events, they can give rise to a
felt unity, a felt coherency, within the group of people involved, spontaneously.
So, although all involved in ‘a situation,’ in the discussion of ‘a topic’ (topos; Gr.
place) or of ‘an issue’, may each express seemingly disparate facets or aspects of
it, they will all experience those facets and aspects as relating to the same
situation, topic or issue, as related to the current circumstance within which they
are all involved. And further, clearly, rather than a ‘closed’ unity, amenable
ultimately to a ‘one true’ account of its nature, it is an always still unfinished, or
“unfinalizable” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 167) unity, ‘open’ to further developmental
change.
We are dealing here, then, not with objective things or events, but with relational
or dialogical things, with ‘things’ that have their existence only in the dynamical
3 Yet)a)lot)of)us—and)I)am)certainly)among)that)‘lot’—don’t)feel)included.)Quite)the)opposite.)I)feel)excluded.)That)
withnessMfeel)often)seems)to)be)lacking.)To)speak)for)myself,)at)this)moment)in)history,)I)feel)very)much)forced)to)
live)in)a)‘world)reality’,)very)much)not)of)my)making.
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relations between our outgoing activities towards our surroundings, and their
incoming results. Such ‘relational things’ emerge as a result of “double
description,” to use Bateson’s (1979) expression, and are of a “different logical
type” to objective things. They are like our seeing of ‘depth’ in binocular
perception, or hearing an orchestra ‘in the round,’ so to speak, or seeing a
‘rainbow’ or the ephemeral ‘interference’ patterns in so-called Moire patterns:

Such sensed differences—amongst similarities—seem to be crucial, literally, to
our making sense of events occurring to us in our surroundings. It is our going out
towards them with certain expectations ‘at the ready,’ so to speak, and our getting
back specific deviations from them, that enables us to relate uniquely and quite
precisely to experienced events. It is these shared feelings in shared circumstances
—these socially shared similarities of feeling—which can constitute the prelinguistic origins, the paradigms or prototypes in relation to which our more
organized, conceptual forms of communication can be fashioned.
If this is the case, then our social orders are not based in anything pre-established
either in individual people or in their particular surroundings, but in these socially
sustained similarities of feeling we ourselves continually create within the
intermingling flows of activity in which we are all immersed, in which we are all
engaged now, here in this conference hall. Thus, if I were to suddenly stop
speaking and say: “Look, I’m a bit bored by this current topic... Been there, done
that... Instead of continuing my advertised talk, let me tell about my new Audi A6
turbo-diesel—wow, it’s really something!” you would have a feeling of: “Huh?
He’s really lost it,” or: “Why is he saying this? I can’t follow him!”—”I’m not
with him anymore.”
Now this feeling of withness, of ‘being in touch with’, is not an esoteric or
unusual experience. We experience its presence—or its absence—within us all the
time. We have a continuing acutely discriminative awareness of it: “Are you with
me,” we say to a friend whom we feel has suddenly stopped being responsive to
us as we talk to her or him. Oliver Sacks (1985) gives a nice example in his
account of how Dr. P—the man who, with damage to his visual cortex, mistook
his wife’s face for a hat—looked, not so much at him, as towards him: “instead of
looking, gazing, at me, ‘taking me in,’ in the normal way,” says Sacks, he “made
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sudden strange fixations—on my nose, on my right ear, down to my chin, up to
my right eye—as if noting (even studying) these individual features, but not
seeing my whole face, its changing expressions, ‘me’, as a whole” (p. 8). Later,
Sacks came to think that “he faced me with his ears... but not with his eyes” (p. 8)
—a hypothesis borne out by other later evidences.
Indeed, as soon as I begin an interchange of looks with another person, and I
sense them as looking toward me in a certain way (as they see me looking toward
them in a similar way also), a little ethical and political world is created between
us. We each look toward each other expectantly, with a whole swath of
anticipations, some shared some not, arising from what we have already lived
through so far in our lives with all the others around us.
But there is more to it that our merely being “locked together by [the various]
involvement obligations” existing amongst us.
If we are to live together in productive harmony, more than just our first noticing
the existence of others around us, with their wants and needs, and opinions and
beliefs, and then realizing, intellectually, that we must invent (and then honour)
various moral codes (as ideals), and comply with various obligations, rights,
duties, and privileges, and so on—as with Hobbes’ and Locke’s “Social
Contract”—much more is required, and much more is at stake. As T.S. Eliot
(1934)—in one of the Choruses within his play The Rock—said about those who
are constantly trying to invent perfectly or ideally just systems of government:
They constantly try to escape
From the darkness outside and within
By dreaming of systems so perfect that no one will need to be
good.
Our experience of what is required of us in our relationships to others is of a much
more indeterminate, diffuse kind. Aware of this long ago, William James (1912)
described it thus:
... much of our experience comes as an insufficient and consists of
process and transition. Our fields of experience have no more
definite boundaries than have our fields of view. Both are fringed
forever by a
that continuously develops, and that
continuously supersedes them as life proceeds. The relations,
generally speaking, are as real here as the terms are. (p. 72)
It is this more that, of course, I want to discuss further here today.
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The transmission of information
But before doing so, I want to take another tack: John Fiske (1990) in his
Introduction to Communication Studies, begins by saying that “Communication is
one of those human activities that everyone recognizes but few can define
satisfactorily, and that consequently, there is the view that communication is not a
subject, in the normal academic sense of the word, but is a multi-disciplinary area
of study” (p. 1, my emphasis). He then says, “to give some coherence to the
confusion” by basing everything else he has to say upon a set of his own—no
doubt, reasonable—assumptions, he is going to assume, “all communication
involves signs and codes. Signs are artefacts or acts that refer to something other
than themselves; that is, they are signifying constructs. Codes are the systems into
which signs are organized and which determine how signs may be related to each
other” (p. 1).
Thus for Fiske, Shannon and Weaver's (1949) Mathematical Theory of
Communication model is, “widely accepted as one of the main seeds out of which
Communication Studies has grown” (Fiske, 1990, p. 6). As engineers working for
Bell Telephone Labs here in the United States, Shannon and Weaver suggested
that communication has primarily to do with the transmission of information, with
the communication of facts, of intelligence, of things people want to know about.
As such, it consists in the transmission of messages by the use of ‘signs’
sequenced according to a ‘code’—and their diagram of a “communication
channel” is, of course, well known.

And he continues with his definitions as to what can constitute a properly
disciplined academic study of communication by outlining two major schools: the
process school and semiotics, where each school interprets the definition of
communication, as ‘social interaction through messages,’ in its own way: “The
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process school sees a message as that which is transmitted by the communication
process... [with the actor’s intention] being a crucial factor in deciding what
constitutes a message…. For semiotics, on the other hand, the message is a
construction of signs which, through interacting with the receiver, produce
meanings. The sender, definer as the transmitter of the message, declines in
importance. The emphasis shifts to the text and how it is ‘read’” (p. 3)—either
way, the taken-for-granted background to both these views is the Cartesian
assumptions of, essentially, a mechanical world of separate, identifiable,
interacting entities in motion according to discoverable laws. 4 But what this
approach does, is to exclude—by fiat, by authoritative pronouncement—all
relational things; only separately existing, nameable, and thus countable things
can be subjected to our studies.5
I am using Fiske’s focus on communication as information transmission here, not
because I want to be critical just of that model, while thinking that others might be
more appropriate. But to use it as an exemplar in being critical of all approaches
that try to bring some “coherence to the confusion”—as Fiske (1990) claims—by
trying to impose
own particular ‘systematic order of things’ upon a whole set
of otherwise, qualitatively distinct, relational happenings that already possess a
partial ordering of their own. If they did not, if the speaking of the word
‘communication’ did not arouse in us a precise, but not yet fully specified sense of
a ‘something’ that could not easily be designated by any other word, we would be
continually bewildering each other every time we opened our mouths to utter the
word. Rather than bringing coherence to the confusion, such imposed definitions
contribute to its increase.
Without our already possessing a knowledge of how, in our daily practices, to use
the word (and many other such words, designating relational things), our daily
communicating with each other would be impossible. There is, thus, a radical
difference between giving or imposing a coherence on what we find, in our
reflections upon it, to be confusing, and finding a coherence, in the course of a

4 In)describing)his)new)approach)to)making)sense)of)our)world,)Descartes)(1968/1637))outlined)it)as)

follows:)“In)order)to)put)these)new)truths)in)a)less)crude)light)and)to)be)able)to)say)more)freely)what)I)
think)about)them,)without)being)obliged)to)accept)or)to)refute)what)are)accepted)opinions)among)
philosophers)and)theologians,)I)resolved)to)leave)all)these)people)to)their)disputes,)and)to)speak)only)of)
what)would)happen)in)a)new)world,)if)God)were)to)create,)somewhere)in)imaginary)space,)enough)
matter)to)compose)it,)and)if)he)were)to)agitate)diversely)and)confusedly)the)different)parts)of)this)
matter,)so)that)he)created)a)chaos)as)disordered)as)the)poets)could)ever)imagine,)and)afterwards)did)no)
more)than)to)lend)his)usual)preserving)action)to)nature,)and)to)let)her)act)according)to)his)established)
laws”)(p.)62,)my)emphasis).
5 But)as)Einstein)is)reputed)to)have)remarked:)“Everything)that)can)be)counted)does)not)necessarily)

count;)everything)that)counts)cannot)necessarily)be)counted.”
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dialogically conducted investigation of what, in our everyday practices, is not at
all confusing to us.
Indeed, claims of this kind reverse—among, as we shall find, many other great
reversals—the relation between our theories and concepts and their ‘grounding,’
‘footing,’ or ‘original soil’ in our sensings and feelings. It is, in the view I am
pursuing here, to impose a particular ‘systematic order of things’ on an otherwise
qualitatively unique, multi-dimensional, relational whole that already has its own
partial ordering, and is in fact still capable of being ordered in an inexhaustible
number of different ways. What happens if we do this, is that the rest of this larger
flow of activity within which we are all still immersed, and from within which
what we attend to within it draws its character, is ignored.
Thus, what is lost in this reversal—in substituting our own supposedly discovered
‘codes’ and ‘signs’ signifying ‘describable meanings,’ for the real thing—is the
living words of a living speaker that can occasion within us the ‘felt’ withness, or
in-touchness, that can occur between ourselves and the speaker, and perhaps, the
spoken of, a resonance between ourselves and the world. Presented to us as an
array only of ‘coded signs’—as in a PowerPoint presentation that we (and often
the presenter) are meant to ‘read’ and ‘interpret’—the essential character of
communication remains, in fact, hidden from us. Rather than presenters speaking
to us in ‘their own voice’, they try to transmit information to us in their
presentations—as if we are always in need of more than we already have.
But when we are ‘touched’ or ‘moved’ by a spoken voice, we can begin to
undergo a bodily and emotional transformation: to be asked a question;6 to be
insulted; to be caught in an error or a lie; to hear unexpectedly that a loved one
has been injured or died, is to feel the arousal within oneself of a tense
‘something,’ distinctly and vividly, even before we are able to understand exactly
what it is that has happened.
Substitute orientations: failing to ‘do justice’ to phenomena
Everything changes, however, once we switch to a view of communication as
occurring within a ceaseless, indivisible flow of entwined strands of
spontaneously responsive, expressive, living, bodily activity—a view adopted by
all those who see communication as a dialogic activity (e.g. Bakhtin, 1981, 1986;
6)For)instance,)in)our)sense)of)what)an)expected)answer)to)a)question)might)be)like:)A)paradigm)

instance)of)the)precision)and)power)of)such)an)expectation)at)work)was)in)the)famous)grilling)on)BBC)
TV)on)13)May)1997,)of)Michael)Howard,)then)Home)Secretary)in)the)current)government)by)a)Jeremy)
Paxman,)in)which)he)asked)Mr)Howard)the)same)question)12)times.)The)audience)could)hear)him)quite)
clearly)failing)to)answer)that)question)12)times.)
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Gadamer, 1975, 2000; Wittgenstein, 1953, 1980; along with many others). For we
move into, not so much an ill-defined reality, as an intrinsically indeterminate
one; a continuously changing and developing reality that is open to an indefinite
(or uncountable) number of determinations. And straightaway we find ourselves
facing, as I mentioned above, instead of one kind of difficulty in life—that of
solving problems—we are facing a second, much more basic difficulty—that of
gaining orientation, of arriving at a sense of what the situation is that we find
ourselves in, prior to all our attempts at solving problems within it. It is in this
kind of flowing, indeterminate, still developing reality that we face Aristotle’s
task: that of acting for the good within it—a task that seems somewhat
unintelligible within the Cartesian world only of already existing objective things.
While what we might call ‘the facts of the matter’ are still of importance to us,
irrespective of whatever ‘the situation’ we happen to be ‘in’, what is of even
greater importance is our sensing of the relations between the possibilities for
action it makes available to us, and what, ethically, we feel we must do within it,
if we are to be the kind of person within it we feel we ought to be. How can we
apply our minds to Aristotle’s question of how our actions should be performed if
we are to be good people?
As I have already mentioned, what is special about our living activities is that, on
the basis of our past experiences, they work within us to give rise to an
anticipatory sense of our what our possible next steps might be. But, to the extent
the situation we are in is indeterminate—and is open to a range of determinations,
but not just to any—it is up to us, individually, in relation to our acutely
discriminative sense of its nature, to arrive at a way of expressing its nature that
both relates us to it, and to the others around us, appropriately. Thus, as we try to
resolve on an appropriate expression of the feelings or sensings that it arouses
within us, we cannot escape the responsibility, in our inner dialogues—as we
stumble around in trying to ‘find the right words’—of ‘doing justice’ to the
uniquely detailed situation we are currently sharing with those others around us.
The ethical and political issues that inevitably emerge within this process are
there, even when not actually confronted by another person.
I’m sorry to have to say this, but I think information-theory based formulations of
the communication process are unethical, in that they fail to ‘do justice’ to what
communication really is.7

7 “(Our)only)task)is)to)be)just.)That)is,)we)must)point)out)and)resolve)the)injustices)of)philosophy,)and)
not)posit)new)parties—and)creeds)”)(Wittgenstein,)1993,)p,181).
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In trying, as Gadamer (1975) puts it, “to provide a substitute for past moral and
political orientations... the concept of ‘praxis’ which was developed in the last
two centuries is an awful deformation of what practice really is” (p. 312, my
emphases). It is awful, not because it ultimately fails to help us in effectively
solving various problems, but because it has (mis)led many of us, especially in
our more professionalized practices, to adopt an objective, quantitative attitude
towards other people as a supposedly rational substitute for our more ordinary,
everyday ways of relating ourselves to others and othernesses around us. This has
resulted in us (mis)leading ourselves further, into treating essentially relational
entities as if they are already separated, or potentially separable and thus
countable things, possessing everything to do with their experienced character as
being, of necessity, located wholly within themselves.
If we are to get to know what we are doing in the course of our doing it—
Aristotle’s concept of praxis—then we need to turn James’ acutely discriminative
awareness toward our gaining a sense of how our actions are playing into the
larger relational context within which they are occurring.
To have a world means to have an orientation
The trouble that we are in at the moment—if what I have been trying to make
visible above is the case—is that we have allowed ourselves to become wrongly
oriented. Although it is believed that a technical expertise is always something
that supplies benefits to the whole of society, the assumption that it will supply
yet further benefits to us all, if it is applied in determining the character of our
everyday relationships to each other is, to put it mildly, a ‘lunatic’ or ‘crackpot’
idea. For, while some of the communications directed towards us can change us
simply in our knowledge, others—that influence our orientations—can change us
in our very ways of being in the world, in how we express ourselves as being in
our ways of orienting or relating to the others and othernesses around us.
I was worried long ago about the, then, long term consequences of the implicit
mechanistic and other inhuman attitudes expressed in much of our behavioural
sciences research (Shotter, 1975, 1980). Now, I think I am beginning to see some
of the consequences of these attitudes being played out in reality. I do not think it
is a mere happenstance that we are now, everywhere, seeing divided counties, a
divided world, and divided, incoherent thoughts as to what we might do for the
best in trying to act within such a fragmented world.
To have a world means to have an orientation (Verhalten—attitude)
towards it. To have an orientation towards the world, however,
means to keep oneself so free from what one encounters of the
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world that one is able to present it to oneself as it is. This capacity
is at once to have a world and to have language. The concept of
world is thus opposed to the concept of environment, which all
living beings in the world possess. (Gadamer, 2000, p. 433)
It is as it is for us because, as we go out, expectantly, towards it, we find
ourselves, to a degree, ‘attuned’ to the others and othernesses that we meet. We
‘resonate’ to it, or ‘feel in touch with’ certain aspects we experience as occurring
within it, while failing to resonate to others. Thus it is within our living contacts
with the others or othernesses in our surroundings, that our mere surroundings, as
an environment, are transformed into “a world” for us—or at least, into a partially
shared world that we sense ourselves as being in along with the others and
othernesses around us, a world which is dependent upon them, both for its initial
coming into being, and for their help in sustaining it in existence.
Due, however, to its partial, still unfinalized, ‘open’ nature, an ineradicable ethics
and politics is at work. Each step forward can be opposed by others, in terms of
what they ‘see it’ as meaning. But more than it having just a local ethics and
politics to it, besides our having particular expectations as to how the others
immediately around us are likely to treat us, our partially shared world has also,
we feel, a deeper level to it. It has a unique culture, and it is this that determines
how they should treat us. The ethics and politics of the dialogical are such that: to
be me, I need you to allow me, and to afford me, to be me.
Thus for each of us, what we call ‘our culture’ presents a ‘world’ to us as it is,
and, as such, it contains a certain set of interconnected things, with certain values
to them in relation to which we take on a certain character, and toward which we
take a certain stance; it also ‘informs’ us of our rights, duties, privileges and
obligations in relation to the significant others around us in my ‘world’: I am a
bus driver with a responsibility for all my passengers, while having to drive in
accord with a time-table; I am a bridge-building engineer attempting to span a
kilometer wide, 500 meter deep chasm; a psychologist surrounded by people who
require the kind of help I can offer them; an architect worrying about both the
efficient and exciting use of space; a mathematician surrounded by other
mathematicians, a painter surrounded by the world of art, a musician, a student of
history, a construction worker, and so on. Along with all of these features, my
world also has a particular ‘horizon’ to it—in that not everything in it is actually
‘visible’ to me at the moment, although I can entertain a reasonable expectation
that at some time in the future it will be—further, I can order ‘my world’ at any
one moment perspectivally in relation to what I take to be the ‘point’ (on the
horizon of my current landscape of action) constituting the ‘end in view’ of my
current action (intention, aim).
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If this is so, then at work in structuring our activities within our cultures are
‘relational somethings’ which cannot be objectively seen and described, but which
we cannot avoid experiencing; we can call these invisible ‘relational somethings’
that nonetheless shape our lives, traditions (Gadamer, 2000). Indeed, in working
within an academic tradition, whether we like it or not, we are continually running
up against others calling our actions into question, continually feeling ourselves as
inadequate to the tasks before us, as having always to step out, if not into a
morally hazardous unknown, certainly a political one: “This is what is to be
experienced,” says Gadamer (2000). “But tradition is not simply a process that
experience teaches us to know and govern; it is language—i.e., it expresses itself
like a Thou. A Thou is not an object; it relates itself to us... For tradition is a
genuine partner in dialogue, and we belong to it, as does the I with a Thou ... the
Thou is not an object but is in relationship with us” (p. 358) In other words, in
being like a Thou, we find it makes ‘demands’ and ‘claims’ upon us, as well as
arousing ‘fears’ or ‘anxieties’ within us if we fail to meet—or consider
transgressing—what ‘it’ requires of us.
If this is so, the major organizing influence at work in shaping our activities in the
world is not based in anything pre-established, either in human beings or in their
surroundings, but in socially shared identities of feeling they themselves create
within the flows of activity occurring between them, within them, and around
them. Vico (1744/1968) called these identities “sensory topics”: (1) “topics”
because they can give rise to “commonplaces,” i.e., to shareable moments within
a flow of social activity which afford common reference, and (2) “sensory”
because they are moments in which shared feelings for already shared
circumstances are created. It is these, he claims, as a sensus communis (common
sense), that constitute the pre-linguistic origins of a social order; they are the
paradigms or prototypical forms of expressions from which more conceptually
organized forms of communication may be derived.
And this, of course, is why we are hardly conscious of what our individual actions
are doing to us, collectively, as we act them out amongst us within our lives
together; this is why we do not, as in our actions in relation to physical objects,
run up against more immediate resistences to them; and this is why it is so hard to
change them, as a change of who, in fact, we are to, and in, ourselves is involved.
Such changes are thus deep changes indeed. Yet, on occasions, they are sorely
needed.
In describing what he saw as occurring as a result of our not being able to trust in
such a felt sensus communis—consisting in a set of shared identities of feeling as
a basis for our living together harmoniously, and our feeling instead that a best
basis needed to be found in ‘winner takes all’ arguments—Vico (1744/1968)
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described the outcome as leading to our becoming more inhuman in a second
‘barbarism of reflection’ than we were in a first ‘barbarism of sense’:
For the latter displayed a generous savagery, against which one
could defend oneself or take flight or be on one’s guard, but the
former, with a base savagery, under soft words and embraces, plots
against the life and fortunes of friends and intimates. (para.1106).
But the phrase which has always grabbed me, is the phrase that expresses that this
comes about, not from people coming to live separately—quite the opposite. It is
from the fact that, “no matter how great the throng and press of their bodies, they
[come to] live like wild beasts in a deep solitude of spirit and will, scarcely any
two being able to agree since each follows his own pleasure or caprice” (para.
1106). In other words, they come to orient towards each other in all their daily
affairs in this inhuman manner.
Moving on from where we actually are—relinquishing utopian dreams
Turning now to what all this means for how we can conduct our inquiries into the
nature of our own human affairs within our academic disciplines, and especially
in the communication discipline: It means, I think, instead of working in terms of
what people argue are ideally ‘the best’ ways, ideas, theorizations, or practices—
and seeking to discover in our inquiries what we take to be these pre-existing,
ideal things—we must accept that we ourselves continually bring such ‘things,’
the subject matter of our studies, into existence.
So, although we may continually talk of our understandings as coming into
existence as a result of our prior ‘thoughts,’ ‘ideas,’ ‘knowledge,’ or ‘deliberate
plans or decisions’—and that, as a result, it seems perfectly reasonable to seek the
namable causal processes responsible—the fact is, such processes can only be
seen as having been at work in people’s performances, after they have been
completed.8
As I see it, this is the case with many more of our named topics of study in the
behavioural sciences and communication disciplines: what are in fact outcomes of
a person’s actions, after those actions have been performed, are taken as
components of the overall process within which they are produced, and as a
result, the theories, models, etc., that we produce are, to put it academically, after
the fact, and beside the point—they set us ‘looking backwards,’ and ‘repeating the
8 William)James)(1890))understood)this)point)very)well—this)reversal)in)which)the)products)of)a)

process)are)used)in)trying)to)describe)the)nature)of)the)process)itself—and)he)called)it)“The)
Psychologist’s)Fallacy”)(p.)196).

http://docs.rwu.edu/nyscaproceedings/vol2012/iss1/3

16

Shotter: KEYNOTE: John Shotter

past’ as if the indeterminate future we now face was already determined. Indeed,
as ‘nameable things’ they are often, in fact, foreshadowed in the very ways in
which, prior to our investigations, we commit ourselves to a particular way or
ways of looking into the phenomena before us. Thus, as I see it, ‘something else’
altogether guides us in the performance of our actions than the nameable things
whose nature we seek to discover in our inquiries. So how can we proceed?
I would like to bring my exploration of some of the ethical issues intrinsic to the
very study of communication to a close here, by returning to where I began: with
the basing of our studies in the acutely discriminative sense that we can have of
the qualitative nature of people’s sensings and feelings. We can begin, both with
our own sensings, and with our noticing the spontaneous expressions of others as
they respond to events occurring to them in their surroundings.
Someone who has been very clear about the need to adopt such a method—a
method that he, in fact, calls a method of comparisons, in which we articulate
what an experienced phenomenon is like—is Amatya Sen (2009) in his book, The
Idea of Justice. He begins it by quoting Charles Dickens’s who, in Great
Expectations, put these words into the mouth of the grown up Pip where he is
recollecting a humiliating encounter with his sister, Estella: “In the little world in
which children have their existence, there is nothing so finely perceived and
finely felt, as injustice” (p. vii). In other words, he wants to begin his inquiries,
not by asking what a perfectly just society would look like, but from our felt
sensing of a something being unjust, from our disquiets, from our feelings of
things being not quite right.
Why? Because: “What moves us, reasonably enough,” he remarks, “is not the
realization that the world falls short of being completely just—which few of us
expect—but that there are clearly remediable injustices around us which we want
to eliminate” (p. vii). Thus, as I suggested above, by situating ourselves within a
particular practical situation within which we can gain a shared sense—along with
all the others around us—of a particular injustice at work, there is a real chance of
us all, working together, arriving at a way of remedying it. For we can all find, in
such a situation, both a guiding motivation and, as we mentally move about
within it, ways to bring to light the resources we need to move on from that
injustice—where the ways we need will involve our theories, to be used, not as
explanatory devices, but as objects of comparison to help us in coming to a felt
sense of what the particular injustice in question is like.
So here—if we want to focus on injustices and the ethics at work in our relations
to each other—we end with a new orientation toward our inquiries in the
communication discipline, as compared with it as the transmission of messages
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within the context of social interaction: a practice-based rather than a theorybased approach. An approach that does not exclude attention to ‘relational things’
like its theory-based cousin. As such, it will give rise to a whole new set of
expectations, a new horizon of future goals and endeavours. However, unlike its
more instrumental, theory-based cousin, we will not be able to expect any final
answers to our general questions. We will never know what actually
communication is—for our way of proceeding will not be ‘seeing patterns’ out in
the world, but with ‘sensing similarities’ within our lives together.
This will not mean, however, that we can do away with theory. We will still need
it. But instead of our arguing with others over which is a best ideal, all our
theories will find a use—a metaphorical and/or poetic use—in bringing to light
similarities (and differences) within our task of clarifying what a particular sensed
injustice is like.
In setting out the possibility of this new orientation for our studies in
communication in this fashion, I am reminded of how Thomas Kuhn (1962)
ended his account of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. He said:
We are all deeply accustomed to seeing science as the one
enterprise that draws constantly nearer to some goal set by nature
in advance. But need there be any such goal? If we can learn to
substitute evolution-from-what-we-do-know for evolution-towardwhat-we-wish-to-know, a number of vexing problems may vanish
in the process. (p. 170)
And this, of course, is what I am proposing here: that we relinquish the still
unfulfilled—and, as I see it, forever unfulfillable—dream of gaining the very
general results we desire in our inquiries, and to be content with the limited,
partial, and situated results we can in fact obtain, which, in the end, will, I
believe, perhaps surprisingly, turn out to be of far greater practical use and value
to us.
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